ABSTRACT: This paper uses the lessons gathered from a brief consideration of the workings of substantive descriptive phrases to develop tw o objections to Anselm 's ontological proof of G od's existence. First, one's understanding of the definition of God does not, as Anselm claims, guarantee that God exists in one's understanding. Second, the proof depends on a flawed interpretation of the denial of G od's existence. The paper concludes by discussing the broader significance of this second objection.
A nselm is m ost fam ous for originating w hat is know n as the ontological proof of G od's existence.1 The proof, as A nselm p res ents it, stipulates a definition of God and then p u rp o rts to show that, given that definition, the denial of G od's existence entails a contradiction. This argum ent strikes m any people as unconvincing, but difficult to refute. In this paper I attem pt to show that A nselm 's proof fails by elucidating the w orkings of substantive descriptive phrases, and show ing how these linguistic considerations are fatal to it. I begin, in section I, by explicating the proof in m ore detail and indicating w here tw o problem s lie. In section II, I introduce the linguistic issues relevant to these problem s. Thereafter, in sections III and IV, I engage A nselm 's proof directly, exam ining in each of these sections one of the problem s introduced in section I. Finally, in section V, I show how the problem dis cussed in section IV m ay have m ore general philosophical significance.
I.
I will set forth the interp retatio n of the proof that will be used th ro u g h out this discussion and indicate w here in the argum ent the problem s are found. A nselm 's argum ent begins w ith the assertions that "the fool" w ants to deny G od's existence and that God is "som ething th an w hich nothing greater can be thought." The rest of A nselm 's argum ent, as he presents it, goes as follows:
But w hen this same fool hears me w hich a greater cannot be tho u g h t cannot exist only in the u n d erstanding. For if it exists only in the understan d in g , it can be tho u g h t to exist in reality as well, w hich is greater. So if that th an w hich a greater can not be tho u g h t exists only in the understan d in g , then that than w hich a greater cannot be tho u g h t is th at than w hich a greater can be thought. But that is clearly im possible. Therefore, there is no doubt that som ething than w hich a greater cannot be tho u g h t exists both in the u n d e rsta n d ing and in reality. 2 I will lay out the argum ent in a different form. A nselm attributes to the fool the following proposition:
(1) Som ething th an w hich nothing greater can be tho u g h t does not exist in reality.
To this A nselm conjoins another proposition, which, he claims, the fool m ust adm it if he u n d erstan d s the expression "som ething than w hich nothing greater can be thought":
(2) Som ething than w hich nothing greater can be thought exists in the u nderstanding.
From this proposition, A nselm thinks, follows another: (3) Som ething than w hich nothing greater can be thought can be thought to exist both in the u n d erstan d in g and in reality.
Finally, A nselm adds another proposition he believes to be undeniable: (4) It is greater to exist both in the u n d erstan d in g and in reality th an to exist only in the u nderstanding.
Proposition (1) denies the p roperty of existence in reality to an object described as som ething than w hich nothing greater can be thought. But it follow s from (2)-(4) th at this description entails that property: if that object does not exist in reality, then som ething can be thought to be greater than it. So the conjunction of (1)-(4) entails the follow ing contradiction:
(5) Som ething can be thought to be greater than som ething th an w hich nothing greater can be thought.
A nselm believes that (2), (3), and (4) are so certain th at the fool can escape this contradiction only by w ithdraw ing (1) and adm itting that som ething than w hich nothing greater can be tho u g h t-G od-exists in reality.
Tw o difficulties plague this argum ent. First, A nselm does not offer sufficient su p p o rt for (2). He claims in the passage above that if the fool adm its to u n d erstan d in g the expression "som ething than w hich nothing greater can be thought," (2) follow s necessarily. As we will see, this claim is incorrect. Second, (1) is am biguous. Above, I gave an interpretation congenial to A nselm 's purposes, according to w hich (1) describes an object in a certain way and denies th at a certain p roperty belongs to this object. But there is another possible inter p retation of (1), and this alternative in terp retatio n will prove to be debilitating to A nselm 's argum ent.
II.
To develop these objections, it will first be necessary to consider the w orkings of descrip tions. A description, as I will use the w ord, is a substantive phrase that refers to some object, if any, by picking out some of its properties. A description specifies some set of properties and refers to whichever object, if any, has that set of properties. For example, the description "the tallest boy in the classroom " specifies the properties of being a boy, being in the classroom, and being taller than any other boy in that classroom, and refers to whichever object has these properties. I will speak of any object that is referred to by a description in virtue of having the set of properties it specifies as an object that satisfies that description.
At this point, three remarks that will be useful to this discussion of Anselm's ontological proof may be made. First, an indicative sentence with a description as its subject typically assumes that some object satisfies that description and asserts something about that object. For example, the sentence "The tallest boy in the classroom has brown hair" is true if, and only if, some object is a boy, is in the classroom, and is taller than any other boy in the classroom, and this object has brown hair.3
Second, u n d erstan d in g a description does not necessarily involve the know ing of an ob ject th at satisfies it.4 This claim is confirm ed by the observation th at I m ay u n d erstan d the description "the tallest boy in the classroom " even before I have com pared the boys in the classroom to determ ine w ho is tallest. This observation is explained by the fact that u n d e r standing a description is a m atter of u n d erstan d in g the properties it specifies. U nderstanding w hat it w ould m ean to be a boy, to be in the classroom , and to be taller th an any other boy in the classroom is sufficient for u n d erstan d in g the description "the tallest boy in the class room ," b u t it does not guarantee know ledge of an object th at has these properties: it does not guarantee know ledge of the tallest boy in the classroom . To p u t the point in A nselm 's term inology, my u n d erstan d in g of the expression "the tallest boy in the classroom " does not ensure that the tallest boy in the classroom exists in my understanding.
From the reasoning supporting the second rem ark follows a third: a description does not have to refer to any object to have a m eaning capable of being understood. This claim is confirm ed by the observation th at the description "the tallest boy in the classroom " w ould be significant and com prehensible even if there w ere no boys in the classroom . This observa tion is explained by the fact th at u n d erstan d in g a description is a m atter of u n d erstan d in g the properties it specifies, along w ith the fact that the possibility of enum erating a set of properties does not depend on w hether any object has all of those properties. It is intelligible to speak of being a boy, being in the classroom , and being taller than any other boy in the classroom even if no object has all three of these properties; therefore the description "the tallest boy in the classroom " is intelligible even if it is not satisfied.
III.
These rem arks about descriptions shed light on A nselm 's proof. The expression "som e thing than w hich nothing greater can be thought" is a description: if it refers to an object, it does so by picking out the p roperty of being as great as anything that can be thought. So the rem arks of the previous section m ay illum inate its function in the argum ent. C onsider p ro p osition (2). A pplying the first rem ark, we see that (2) m ay be analyzed into the following: (2a) There is an object that satisfies the description "som ething than w hich nothing greater can be thought." (2b) This object exists in the u nderstanding.
Proposition (2) is true if, and only if, the conjunction of (2a) and (2b) is true.
A pplying the second and third rem arks, we see that the reasons A nselm offers for ac cepting (2) are insufficient. C onsider the second rem ark. A nselm m aintains that som ething than w hich nothing greater can be tho u g h t m ust exist in the fool's u n d erstan d in g because "w hen this sam e fool hears me say 'som ething than w hich nothing greater can be th o u g h t,' he surely u n d e rsta n d s w hat he hears," and because "w hat he u n d e rsta n d s exists in his understan d in g ."5 But we saw in discussion of the second rem ark that u n d erstan d in g a de scription is a m atter of u n d erstan d in g the properties it specifies and that u n d erstan d in g a set of properties does not guarantee know ledge of an object that has those properties. So, it w ould be m ore app ro p riate to say that the p roperty of being as great as anything that can be tho u g h t exists in the fool's understanding; it does not follow from A nselm 's rem arks that any object w ith this p roperty exists in the fool's u n d erstanding. So, the fool's u n d erstan d in g of the expression "som ething than w hich nothing greater can be th o ught" is not a reason to accept (2b).
N ow consider the third rem ark. The description "som ething th an w hich nothing greater can be th o ught" can be com prehensible to the fool w ithout there being any object th at satis fies that description. The possibility of u n d erstan d in g the p roperty of being as great as any thing th at can be tho u g h t does not depend on there being an object th at has th at property. So, the fool's u n d erstan d in g of the expression "som ething than w hich nothing greater can be thought" is not a reason to accept (2a) either.
So, (2) is not established by anything A nselm says on the subject. Furtherm ore, since (3) seem s to depend on (2) for su p p o rt,6 there is no reason to hold onto it if (2) is rejected. P ro p osition (1), the fool's denial of G od's existence, is no longer the only one in doubt. There are now tw o options open to the fool if he w ants to avoid contradiction. Since the conjunction of (2)-(4) does not entail a contradiction, he m ay accept those propositions and, as A nselm suggests, w ith d raw (1) and adm it the existence of God. But since A nselm 's argum ent does not establish (2) and (3), he m ay instead w ith d raw those propositions. In th at case, he m ay hold onto to (1) and continue to deny the existence of God, since the conjunction of (1) and (4) does not entail a contradiction. Propositions (2) and (3) are necessary, in A nselm 's proof, to show th at the fool's denial of G od's existence entails a contradiction. Because A nselm 's argum ent fails to establish these propositions, it fails to prove the existence of God.
5. Anselm, 7. 6. Anselm's argument for (3) makes use of the claim that "if it exists only in the understanding, it can be thought to exist in reality as well," ibid. The thought seems to be that an object's existence in the understanding is what makes it possible to imagine its existence in reality.
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IV.
A nother problem w ith the proof rem ains to be addressed. I m entioned in section I that (1), the p roof's expression of the denial of G od's existence, poses an interpretive problem . I rem arked in section II that an indicative sentence w ith a description as its subject typically assum es that some object satisfies that description and asserts som ething about that object. If we in terp ret (1) according to this rule of thum b, it affirm s this proposition:
(la) There is an object that satisfies the description "som ething than w hich nothing greater can be thought."
A nd it denies this one:
(lb ) This object exists in reality.
On this interpretation, (1) is true if, and only if, the conjunction of (1a) and the denial of (1b) is true. On this interpretation, the conjunction of (1)-(4) entails a contradiction. The contradiction arises because if (1) is taken to affirm (1a) and to deny (1b), then it denies to an object a p roperty which, according to (2)- (4), is entailed by the description it gives to that sam e object.
This construal of (1) m ay be a natural one. But it should be rejected because, on this in ter pretation, show ing that (1), w hen conjoined w ith (2)-(4), entails a contradiction is not suf ficient to establish the p roof's intended conclusion. The goal of the proof is to dem onstrate that som ething th an w hich nothing greater can be th o u g h t exists in reality by show ing that the denial of this proposition entails a contradiction. So, if show ing th at (1), w hen conjoined w ith (2)-(4), entails a contradiction is to establish the intended conclusion that som ething than w hich nothing greater can be tho u g h t exists in reality, (1) m ust express a strict denial of this proposition.
But consider w hat the denial of this proposition w ould m ean. A ccording to the rule of thum b given by the first rem ark of section II, the proposition th at som ething th an w hich nothing greater can be tho u g h t exists in reality assum es that some object satisfies the de scription "som ething th an w hich nothing greater can be thought" and asserts that this object exists in reality: it is true if, and only if, the conjunction of (1a) and (1b) is true. So, the proof m ust show that the denial of the conjunction of (1a) and (1b) entails a contradiction. Conse quently, (1) m ust be construed not as the conjunction of (1a) and the denial of (1b) b u t as the denial of the conjunction of (1a) and (1b).
But on this interpretation, the conjunction of (1)- (4) does not entail a contradiction in the sam e way. On the first interpretation, a contradiction arose because (1) denied to an object a property, w hich according to (2)- (4), is entailed by the description it gave to th at same object. But on this interpretation, (1) does not im ply that any object satisfies the description "som ething th an w hich nothing greater can be thought": (1) is true if an object satisfies that description bu t does not exist in reality or if nothing satisfies that description. C onsequently, it is not open to the charge th at it gives th at description to an object b u t denies to th at ob ject a p roperty entailed by th at description. N othing (2)-(4) m ight assert about w hat that description entails could produce any contradiction betw een those propositions and (1). So proper interp retatio n of (1) thw arts the p roof's strategy of dem onstrating th at the denial of G od's existence entails a contradiction by setting forth propositions (2)- (4) to show th at the definition of God entails existence in reality.7
V.
There is a m ore general lesson to be learned. My analysis in section III frees the fool to deny G od's existence w ithout contradiction by show ing th at nothing A nselm says gives suf ficient reason to accept (2) and (3). But (1) and (4), the propositions left untouched by that analysis, can easily be reform ulated, w ithout being unfaithful to the spirit of A nselm 's arg u m ent, so that their conjunction entails a contradiction. Som eone w ho w anted to resuscitate the proof m ight begin by redefining God as the being w ith all perfections. P roposition (1), the denial of G od's existence, could then be recast as the following:
(1') The being w ith all perfections does not exist.
The defender of the proof m ight then replace (4) w ith the follow ing principle:
(4') Existence is a perfection.
From (1') and (4') a contradiction som ething like (5) appears to follow:
(5') The being w ith all perfections lacks at least one perfection.
We seem to be forced to w ith d raw (1').8 A proof m uch like A nselm 's can circum vent the problem s raised by my analysis of (2) and (3) in section III. This sort of circum vention is possible because that analysis leaves open the general strategy of dem onstrating that the denial of G od's existence entails a contradiction by show ing that some definition of God entails existence. It only show s the failure of a particular attem pt to show that a particular definition of God entails existence.
But the objection developed in section IV is as decisive against this new version of the proof as it is against the original version. P roposition (1'), just as m uch as (1), poses an inter pretive problem . On the interp retatio n dictated by the first rem ark of section II, (1') affirms this proposition:
(1'a) There is an object th at satisfies the description "the being w ith all perfections." 7. As we saw in section III, Anselm's proof requires the assumption that an object satisfies the description "something than which noth ing greater can be thought" for the truth of (2) as well as for the more serviceable interpretation of (1). Consequently, the fool would have to reject (2) to avoid applying that description to any object in order to hold onto the construal of (1) that I have said thwarts the proof. (And he may, since Anselm does not give sufficient reason to accept (2), as we saw in section III). In spite of this connection, I have chosen to deal with (1) and (2) separately because the problem of the interpretation of (1) has a more general philosophical significance that is explored on its own in section V. 8. Descartes formulates a version of the proof essentially the same as this one when he argues that "it is no less contradictory to think of God (that is, a supremely perfect being) lacking existence (that is, lacking some perfection) than it is to think of a mountain without a valley," in Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress, 4th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998): 89. A nd it denies this one:
(1'b) This object exists.
On this construal, (1') denies to an object a property, w hich according to (4'), is entailed by the description it gives to th at sam e object. This construal of (1'), w hen conjoined w ith (4'), entails a contradiction.
But this interpretation, like the first interp retatio n given of (1), is inadequate. The goal of this new proof is to dem onstrate th at the being w ith all perfections exists by show ing that the denial of that proposition entails a contradiction. The proposition th at the being w ith all perfections exists is true if and only if the conjunction of (1'a) and (1'b) is true. So, (1'), the denial of the existence of the being w ith all perfections, m ust be construed as the denial of the conjunction of (1'a) and (1'b). But because (1'), on this interpretation, does not give the description "the being w ith all perfections" to any object, it cannot be claim ed that it gives th at description to an object and then denies to that object a p roperty entailed by th at de scription. So, the new version of the proof fails because the p roper construal of (1') does not entail a contradiction w hen conjoined w ith (4').
A n im portant lesson can be d raw n from this discussion of this new version of the proof. Both versions of the proof attem pt to dem onstrate that the denial of G od's existence entails a contradiction by show ing th at some definition of God entails existence. The lesson is that the problem of the in terp retatio n of the denial of G od's existence is equally fatal to any proof th at em ploys this strategy.
Let me explain w hy in general term s. As the discussion of this and the previous section il lustrates, this strategy requires an interp retatio n of the denial of G od's existence according to w hich some object satisfies the definition of God and this object does not exist: propositions show ing th at anything that satisfies the definition m ust exist contradict the denial of G od's existence if, and only if, the denial of G od's existence is given this sort of interpretation. But this sort of interp retatio n is not correct. Since the proposition th at God exists is true if, and only if, some object satisfies the definition of God and this object exists, the denial of G od's existence is true if, and only if, it is false th at some object satisfies the definition of God and this object exists. So, the denial of G od's existence does not assum e that any object satisfies the definition of God. A nd if the denial of G od's existence does not m ake this assum ption, then it is not inconsistent w ith any proposition asserting th at existence is required by the definition of God. So, any attem pt to dem onstrate th at the denial of G od's existence entails a contradiction by show ing that some definition of God entails existence is bound to fail.
By paying careful attention to the w orkings of descriptions, we have learned a great deal about the w eaknesses in A nselm 's ontological proof of G od's existence. We u n d erstan d now th at A nselm fails to su p p o rt his claim that som ething th an w hich nothing greater can be tho u g h t exists in the u nderstanding. We also u n d erstan d that the proof depends on a flawed interp retatio n of the denial th at som ething th an w hich nothing greater can be th o u g h t exists in reality. M ost im portantly, we u n d erstan d th at this second type of problem is fatal to any proof th at p u rp o rts to dem onstrate th at the denial of G od's existence entails a contradiction by show ing that the definition of God entails existence. ■
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